In a classic optimization problem the complete input data is known to the algorithm. This assumption may not be true anymore in optimization problems motivated by the Internet where part of the input data is private knowledge of independent selfish agents. The goal of algorithmic mechanism design is to provide (in polynomial time) a solution to the optimization problem and a set of incentives for the agents such that disclosing the input data is a dominant strategy for the agents. In case of NP-hard problems, the solution computed should also be a good approximation of the optimum.
In a classic optimization problem the complete input data is known to the algorithm. This assumption may not be true anymore in optimization problems motivated by the Internet where part of the input data is private knowledge of independent selfish agents. The goal of algorithmic mechanism design is to provide (in polynomial time) a solution to the optimization problem and a set of incentives for the agents such that disclosing the input data is a dominant strategy for the agents. In case of NP-hard problems, the solution computed should also be a good approximation of the optimum.
In this paper we focus on mechanism design for multi-objective optimization problems, where we are given the main objective function, and a set of secondary objectives which are modeled via budget constraints. Multi-objective optimization is a natural setting for mechanism design as many economical choices ask for a compromise between different, partially conflicting, goals. Our main contribution is showing that two of the main tools for the design of approximation algorithms for multi-objective optimization problems, namely approximate Pareto curves and Lagrangian relaxation, can lead to truthful approximation schemes.
By exploiting the method of approximate Pareto curves, we devise truthful FPTASs for multi-objective optimization problems whose exact version admits a pseudo-polynomial-time algorithm, as for instance the multi-budgeted versions of minimum spanning tree, shortest path, maximum (perfect) matching, and matroid intersection.
Our technique applies also to multi-dimensional knapsack and multi-unit combinatorial auctions. Our FPTASs compute a (1 + )-approximate solution violating each budget constraint by a factor (1 + ). For a relevant sub-class of the mentioned problems we also present a PTAS (not violating any constraint), which combines the approach above with a novel monotone way to guess the heaviest elements in the optimum solution.
Finally, we present a universally truthful Las Vegas PTAS for minimum spanning tree with a single budget constraint. This result is based on the Lagrangian relaxation method, in combination with our monotone guessing step and a random perturbation step (ensuring low expected running time in a way similar to the smoothed analysis of algorithms). All the mentioned results match the best known approximation ratios, which however are obtained by non-truthful algorithms.
Introduction
A multi-objective combinatorial optimization problem is characterized by a set S ⊆ 2 U of feasible solutions defined over a ground set U of m elements, and a set of objective cost functions i : U → Q + , i = 0, . . . , k. In this paper we assume k = O(1). The aim is finding a solution S ∈ S optimizing i (S) = e∈S i (e) for all i, where optimizing means maximizing or minimizing, depending on the objective. A typical way to deal with multiple objectives is turning all the objectives but one into budget constraints (see, e.g., [21] and references therein for related approaches). More formally, let X be the set of incidence vectors corresponding to S, and B i ∈ Q + , i = 1, . . . , k, a set of budgets. We consider a problem P defined as: This framework naturally models network design problems with resource constraints. For example, in the budgeted minimum spanning tree problem (BMST) U is the set of edges of a graph G = (V, E), S is the set of spanning trees of G, best = min and there is a unique budget constraint with 1 =≤. Here 0 (e) can be used to model, e.g, the cost of establishing a link on e, and 1 (e) the delay on that edge. The budgeted shortest path problem (BSP) is defined analogously, where spanning trees are replaced by the paths between two given nodes. Alternatively, (U, S) might define the intersection of two matroids.
In this paper we study this family of optimization problems from a game theoretical point of view. We are given a set of selfish agents, where agent f controls element f ∈ U. The type f = ( 0 (f ), . . . , k (f )) is considered as private knowledge of f . Agent f can lie by declaring a type f = f , with the constraint
In the examples above, agent f might declare a larger delay on f than the smallest possible 1 (f ) in order to reduce her operational costs (while f is not able to offer a delay smaller than 1 (f )). Moreover, f might declare a cost larger than 0 (f ) to maximize her revenue, or a smaller cost to maximize her chances to be part of the solution. (For further motivations on this model of selfish agents please refer to Section 2.) The main goal of (utilitarian) mechanism design is forcing f to declare her true type. This is achieved by defining a set of payments p f (·), f ∈ U. Payments, type and computed solution define agents' utility (please see Section 2 for utility definition). Payments should be defined such that saying the truth is a dominant strategy, i.e. each agent maximizes her utility by declaring her true type, independently of what the other agents declare. In that case the mechanism is truthful. At the same time, we wish to design mechanisms which compute (efficiently) a solution approximating the optimum in a standard sense, with respect to the declarations. The objective of P is also called social welfare in this context.
Related work
A classical technique to design truthful mechanisms is the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism [24, 7, 12] which however requires to solve optimally the underlying optimization problem. For NP-hard problems one can use the approach of [5, 15] , who show that, in order to obtain truthfulness, it is sufficient to design an approximation algorithm which is also monotone. Informally, an algorithm is monotone if, assuming that it computes a solution containing an element f for a given problem, then it computes a solution containing f also in the case that we replace, for some i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k}, i (f ) with¯ i (f ) i i (f )
1 . Efficient monotone algorithms are known only for a few special cases of the framework above. For example by setting best = max, i =≤ for all i ≥ 1, and using a trivial set of feasible solutions S = 2 U , one can model the multi-dimensional knapsack problem. For this problem a monotone O(k 1/B ) approximation is given in [5] , where B is the smallest budget. Their result extends to multi-unit combinatorial auctions for unknown single-minded bidders. (See [3, 8, 9, 14] for results on more general types of bidders). A monotone PTAS is known for multiple knapsack [5] , which can be modeled in our framework by letting one agent control a constant number of elements. This extends to multiunit unit-demand auctions for unknown multi-minded bidders with the same valuation for each alternative. For graph problems, monotone FPTASs are known for BSP and for BMST in the special case of boundedtreewidth graphs [5] . We note that these FPTASs do not violate the budget constraint, but it is not clear how to extend them to more than one budget. Another related result is a bicriteria monotone algorithm for the spanning arborescence problem [4] .
Our contributions
Our main contribution is to show that two of the main tools for the design of approximation schemes, namely approximate Pareto curves and Lagrangian relaxation, can lead to monotone and thus truthful algorithms.
Monotone construction of approximate Pareto curves. Our first contribution is a family of monotone multi-criteria FPTASs for the optimization problem P considered here, whose exact version admits a pseudopolynomial-time algorithm A (see Section 3). We recall that, for a given weight function ϕ : U → Q + and target B, the exact version of P consists of finding a feasible solution S ∈ S of weight ϕ(S) = e∈S ϕ(e) = B, if any. We implicitly assume that it is possible to remove all the solutions containing a given e ∈ U from S in polynomial time such that the resulting problem is of the same form as the original one (in this case we say that e is discarded ). This is trivially true for all the applications considered in this paper. Our approximation schemes compute, for any given > 0, a solution within a factor (1+ ) of the optimum which violates each budget constraint by a factor of at most (1 + ). The running time is polynomial in the size of the input and 1/ . Theorem 1.1. There is a truthful multi-criteria FP-TAS for multi-objective problems P admitting a pseudopolynomial-time algorithm for their exact version.
Our result implies truthful FPTAS for a number of natural games. For example this covers the mentioned budgeted minimum spanning tree and budgeted shortest paths problems, and their generalizations with multiple budgets (possibly with budget lower bounds as well, which can be used to enforce, e.g., minimum quality standards). This generalizes the results in [5] . In the relevant special case of the budgeted (perfect) matching problem, where S is the set of matchings or perfect matchings of a graph G, the unique pseudo-polynomialtime exact algorithm known is Monte-Carlo [17] (a deterministic algorithm is known when G is planar [2] ). In particular, with small probability this algorithm might fail to find an existing exact solution. In this case we can still apply our technique, but the resulting FPTAS is only probabilistically truthful. We recall that a randomized mechanism is probabilistically truthful if saying the truth is a dominant strategy with high probability (see, e.g., [1] ). Using the reduction to matching in [2] , we can achieve the same result for the budgeted cycle packing problem: find a node-disjoint packing of cycles of minimum cost and subject to budget constraints. The Monte-Carlo algorithm in [6] implies a probabilistically truthful FPTAS for the multi-budgeted version of the problem of finding a basis in the intersection of two matroids.
We remark that our approach also implies truthful multi-criteria FPTASs for multi-dimensional knapsack and for multi-unit combinatorial auctions for unknown multi-minded bidders with same valuation for each alternative and a fixed number of goods. This extends and improves on the results in [5] (see Section 1.1).
Our monotone FPTAS builds up on the construction of approximate Pareto curves by Papadimitriou and Yannakakis [19] . A Pareto solution S for a multiobjective problem is a solution such that there is no other solution S which is as good as S on all objectives, and strictly better on at least one objective. The (potentially exponentially big) set of Pareto solutions defines the Pareto curve. [19] introduces the notion of -approximate Pareto-curve, i.e. a subset of solutions such that every Pareto solution is within a factor (1 + ) on each objective from some solution in the approximate curve. In the same paper the authors describe a general framework to construct such a curve in polynomial time in the size of the problem and 1/ : a sufficient condition to do that is the existence of a pseudo-polynomial-time algorithm A for the exact version of the underlying feasibility problem. Their approach implies a multi-criteria FPTAS for the associated optimization problems where all the objectives but one are turned into budget constraints.
In this paper we show how to make monotone the FPTAS above. To that aim, we need to solve different subproblems, and extract the best solution obtained. Unfortunately, even if we use a monotone algorithm to solve each subproblem, the overall algorithm is not necessarily monotone. A similar issue is addressed in [5, 16] , by defining a property strictly stronger than monotonicity: bitonicity. Roughly speaking, a monotone algorithm is bitonic if the cost of the solution improves when the set of parameters improves and vice versa. [5] shows that a proper combination of bitonic algorithms is monotone and we use the same basic approach. Monotone Lagrangian relaxation. The approach above relies on the existence of a pseudo-polynomialtime exact algorithm and violates budget constraints by a (1+ ) factor. The second contribution of this paper is a technique based on the Lagrangian relaxation method which achieves (strict) budget feasibility but which cannot be used as a black-box as the FPTAS above (i.e., it requires the development of complementary, problem-specific, techniques). Using this alternative approach, we design a monotone randomized PTAS for the budgeted minimum spanning tree problem. This implies a universally truthful mechanism for the corresponding problem (see Section 4). We recall that a randomized mechanism is universally truthful if saying the truth is a dominant strategy for every outcome of the random bits. Universal truthfulness is the strongest form of truthfulness for randomized mechanisms [9, 18] .
There is a universally truthful Las Vegas PTAS for BMST.
For a comparison, [5] gives a truthful FPTAS for the same problem on bounded-treewidth graphs, while the deterministic PTAS in [20] is not truthful.
The basic idea is combining our framework based on the composition of bitonic algorithms with the (nonmonotone) PTAS of Goemans and Ravi [20] . The authors consider the Lagrangian relaxation of the problem with respect to the optimal Lagrangian multiplier (see, e.g. [13] and references therein for the Lagrangian relaxation method). Among the solutions of optimal Lagrangian cost, they return a feasible solution S − which is adjacent to an infeasible solution S + (still of optimal Lagrangian cost). The authors show that 0 (S − ) exceeds the cost of the minimum spanning tree at most by the cost of one edge. In order to get a PTAS, they simply guess the 1/ most expensive edges of the optimal solution in a preliminary step, and reduce the problem consequently.
2
Standard guessing is not compatible with monotonicity (and hence with bitonicity). To see that, consider the case that the modified element f is part of the guess, and hence the edges of cost larger than f (other than guessed edges) are removed from the graph. Then, decreasing the cost of f too much, leads to an infeasible problem where all non-guessed edges are discarded. In order to circumvent this problem, we developed a novel guessing step, where, besides guessing heavy edges, we also guess approximately their cost. This might seem counter-intuitive since one could simply consider their real cost, but it is crucial to prove bitonicity. We also remark that this has no (significant) impact on the running time and approximation factor of the algorithm, since the number of guesses remains polynomial and at least one of them correctly identifies the heaviest edges and their approximate cost. As far as we know, this is the first time that guessing is implemented in a monotone way: this might be of independent interest. However, this is still not sufficient to achieve our goal. In fact, with Ravi and Goemans approach, several candidate solutions might be output. This introduces symmetries which have to be broken in order to guarantee bitonicity. One possibility is choosing, among the candidate solutions, the one with the largest cost. Also in this case, choosing the worst-cost solution might seem counter-intuitive. However, it is crucial to achieve bitonicity, and it has no impact on the (worstcase) approximation factor. The desired solution can be found by exploring exhaustively the space of the solutions of optimal Lagrangian cost. In fact, these solutions induce a connected graph which can be visited, starting from any such solution, in polynomial time in the size of the graph. The difficulty here is that this graph can be exponentially big. We solve this problem by means of randomization, in a way pretty close to the smoothed analysis of (standard) algorithms [23] . More specifically, we randomly perturb the input instance by multiplying each cost by a random, independent factor (close to one, to preserve the approximation ratio). After this perturbation, with high probability there will be only two optimal Lagrangian solutions.
As a consequence, the running time of the algorithm is polynomial in expectation (the algorithm is Las-Vegas). For our mechanism viewed as a probability distribution over deterministic mechanisms (one for each possible value of the perturbation) to be universally truthful we have to prove that each of these deterministic algorithms is monotone (in fact bitonic). We prove this by a kind of sensitivity analysis of 2-dimensional packing linear programs that correspond to the lower envelope of lines representing spanning trees in the Lagrangian relaxation approach of [20] . This analysis differs from the standard packing LP sensitivity analysis (see, e.g., [22] ) in that we also change an entry of the LP matrix and not only the right-hand-side constants.
We can combine the monotone guessing step above with a slight variant 3 of the truthful FPTAS described before to obtain truthful PTASs for problems which are inclusion-closed, i.e. such that removing any element from a feasible solution preserves feasibility. These PTASs assume that we can remove in polynomial time all the solutions in S not containing a given element e ∈ U. An application of inclusion-closed problems satisfying this assumption is, for example, the problem of computing a (possibly non-perfect) matching of maximum cost, subject to budget upper bounds. The proof of the following theorem will be given in the full version of the paper.
There is a (probabilistically) truthful PTAS for inclusion-closed multi-objective problems P admitting a pseudo-polynomial-time (Monte-Carlo) algorithm A for their exact version.
Preliminaries and notation
As noted above, in this work we consider the case in which the type f = ( 0 (f ), 1 (f ), . . . , k (f )) of each agent f is private information. We consider the general framework of generalized single-minded agents introduced in [5] . For a given algorithm A, let S be the solution given in output by A on input declarations ( f ) f ∈U . Agent f with type f evaluates solution S according to the valuation function described in Figure  1 . A mechanism augments algorithm A with a payment function p. The mechanism (A, p) on input ( f ) f ∈U computes solution S and awards agent f a payment p f (( f ) f ∈U ) which is non-positive if best = max and non-negative when best = min. Agent f derives utility The mechanism is truthful if, for each agent f , the utility is maximized by truthtelling, i.e.,
for each f and −f with −f denoting the declarations of all agents but f . [5, 15] show that designing a monotone algorithm is sufficient to obtain a truthful mechanism for agents with valuation functions as above. We recall that algorithm A is monotone if f ∈ S implies that f ∈S withS denoting the solution computed by
Proposition 2.1. ( [5, 15] ) For generalized singleminded agents, a monotone algorithm A admits a payment function p such that (A, p) is a truthful mechanism for P.
4
Generalized single-minded agents adapt well to our setting. Consider again the case in which P models BMST problem and 0 (f ) and 1 (f ) are respectively the cost and the delay experienced when using edge f . As noted, agent f cannot lie promising a delay smaller than her true one (or otherwise the mechanism can a posteriori verify that the agent lied). In the valuation function above, this is reflected by a valuation of −∞ for declarations in which agents underbid the delay. (In other words, an agent would incur an infinite cost to provide the service with a smaller delay.) More generally, the valuation functions that we consider model optimization problems P in which budgeted parameters are somehow verifiable (thus implying that certain lies are irrational for a selfish agent).
Valuation function in Figure 1 connects with two different research areas in Algorithmic Mechanism Design. Mechanisms with verification, introduced by [18] , exploit the observation that the execution of the mechanism can be used to verify agents misreporting their types (i.e., the entire type must be verifiable). On the contrary, in our framework this assumption is only made for budgeted parameters, i.e., 0 (·)'s can model unverifiable quantities (e.g., costs). Valuation function of Figure 1 expresses the valuation of single-minded bidders in a Combinatorial Auction (considered the paradigmatic problem in Algorithmic Mechanism Design) using exact 5 allocation algorithms. Indeed, it is enough to consider the budgeted parameter as the demand set (i.e., a bidder evaluates −∞ a set which is not a superset of her unique demand set).
We conclude that generalized single-minded agents is a general framework motivated by Combinatorial Auctions that well encompasses the multi-objective optimization problems we consider. However, observe that if we would allow unrestricted ways of lying on budgeted parameters then even a VCG mechanism (using an exponential-time optimal algorithm) would not be truthful for a multi-objective optimization problem P. To see this, consider again the BMST problem and take as instance a triangle graph with delay budget L. Name the three edges of the graph e 1 , e 2 and e 3 and assume the true types are e1 = ( , ), e2 = (0, 0) and e3 = (0, H) for some 0 < ≤ L and H > L. When agents are truthtelling the VCG mechanism would select the only feasible tree comprised of edges e 1 and e 2 . The utility of edge e 3 is in this case 0. Now consider edge e 3 misreporting her type as follows e3 = (0, L). In this case the VCG mechanism would select the tree comprised by edges e 2 and e 3 (i.e., the minimum cost tree among the seemingly feasible ones) and pay agent e 3 an amount of > 0. Since the true cost of e 3 is 0 then e 3 has a strict improvement of her utility by lying. (Note that on the contrary in our generalized single-minded setting the valuation of e 3 would be −∞ in this case.) VCG fails since there is a part of agents' type (namely, the delay) whose lies are not reflected in the objective function considered by VCG (which is only the sum of the costs). Note, however, that overbidding the delay can only shrink the set of seemingly feasible solutions and thus gives no advantages to unselected agents. Indeed, as observed above VCG is truthful (though not efficient) in our generalized single-minded setting. Finally, we remark that the example described above can be tweaked to show that no algorithm with polynomially bounded approximation guarantee can be used to obtain a truthful mechanism satisfying a strict form of voluntary participation (i.e., a mechanism in which se-lected agents always have a strictly positive utility). It is enough to consider the same instance with e1 = (M, ) and e2 = (1, 0). Any M -approximation algorithm in input e1 , e2 and e3 must select the tree comprised of edges e 2 and e 3 .
Notation.
For notational convenience, we assume that our algorithms, in case they are not able to find a solution, anyway return a special null solution N , whose cost is −∞ for best = max, and +∞ otherwise. For ease of presentation, we will assume that costs, lengths, and budgets are strictly positive, and the optimum solution OP T is not empty. These assumptions can be removed at the cost of more technical algorithms and analysis. We will denote by f the element whose cost/length is modified as by monotonicity condition, and by e a generic element. We use an upper bar to denote quantities in the modified problem.
Composition of bitonic algorithms. Consider a cost function c : 2 U → Q + , and let be a corresponding order relation. In the following we will always assume = 0 , while the choice of c(·) depends on the context. For a given algorithm A, let P be the original problem. ByP we denote a problem in which f declares¯ i (f ) i (f ) for some i = 0, . . . , k. We let S andS to be the solutions returned by A on problems P andP, respectively. (ii) If f / ∈ S, then either f ∈S orc(S) c(S).
Observe that a bitonic algorithm is monotone, while the vice versa is not necessarily true. As shown in [5] , bitonic algorithms can be combined to get a monotone algorithm.
Theorem 2.1. (Composition Theorem) [5]
Consider a procedure M which generates a (potentially infinite) family of subproblems P 1 , P 2 , . . ., solves each subproblem P i with a procedure M i and returns the solution S i to problem P i minimizing (resp., maximizing) c i (S i ), for given cost functions c i (·). (The best solution with largest index i in case of ties). If each procedure M i is bitonic with respect to c i (·), then M is monotone.
Approximate Pareto curves and monotone multi-criteria FPTASs
In this section we restrict our attention to multiobjective optimization problems P whose exact version admits a pseudo-polynomial-time algorithm A.
For these problems we describe a monotone multicriteria FPTAS multi. Our approach is inspired, approximation-wise, by the construction ofapproximate Pareto curves in [19] , and crucially exploits the combination of bitonic procedures to achieve monotonicity. Figure 2 . The basic idea is generating a family of subproblems P 1 , . . . , P q . Each subproblem P j is solved by means of a procedure feasible, hence obtaining a solution S j and a cost function 0,j (·) (Step M1). This procedure is designed in order to be bitonic with respect to 0,j (·) on subproblem P j . Eventually multi returns the solution S h optimizing 0,h (S h ), the best solution with largest index h in case of ties (Step M2).
Algorithm Algorithm multi is described in
In more detail, let 0,min and 0,max be the smallest and largest cost 0 , respectively. We define B 0,1 0 . . . 0 B 0,q to be all the (positive and/or negative) powers of (1 + ) between proper boundary values. For each B 0,j , P j is the feasibility problem obtained by considering the set of constraints of the original problem P, plus the constraint e∈U 0 (e)x e B 0,j .
For a given subproblem P j , procedure feasible assumes B 0 := B 0,j . The aim of the procedure is computing an -feasible solution to P j , i.e. a solution
signi . Moreover, feasible returns a cost function 0,j (·) such that the behavior of feasible is bitonic with respect to function 0,j (·) on subproblem P j (more details in the proof of Lemma 3.2). In order to achieve this goal, feasible first constructs an auxiliary feasibility problem P j , with lengths i (e) and budgets B i which are polynomially-bounded in m/ (Steps F1 and F2). The definitions of those auxiliary lengths and budgets are such that any feasible (w.r.t. i (·), i ≥ 1) solution for P j is feasible for P j , and every feasible solution to P j is -feasible (w.r.t. i (·), i ≥ 1) for P j (more details in the proof of Lemma 3.1). Then feasible finds a feasible solution for P j by encoding this problem in a proper family of exact problems, which are solved by means of A (Step F3). Each exact problem is indexed by a vector z = (z 0 , . . . , z k ) in a proper domain × F2: For i = 1, . . . , k, for all e ∈ U :
i(e) .
F2b: best z in lexicographic sense, besides providing a good approximation ratio (due to the fact that we optimize z 0 first), is crucial to enforce bitonicity.
Note that in Step F3, in case of multiple solutions of target value B, the algorithm returns the solution of largest incidence vector. This tie breaking rule is also crucial to achieve bitonicity. It is easy to modify a given exact algorithm A to enforce this property. Let e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e m be the elements, and B = B. For i = 1, . . . , m, we add a very large (but still polynomial) value L to ϕ(e i ), and ask for a solution of target value L + B . For L large enough, any such solution must contain e i . If no such solution exists, we discard e i . Otherwise, we set B ← B + L. In both cases we proceed with next edge. Here we exploit the assumption that discarding one element does not change the nature of the considered problem.
Analysis
Let us bound the running time and approximation factor of multi. Proof. Consider the running time of feasible on a given subproblem P j . Lengths i (·) and budgets B i are polynomially bounded in m/ . Consequently, the number of exact problems generated to solve Consider now the approximation factor. We initially observe that, for any solution S returned for some subproblem P j , and for any i ≥ 1,
In particular, the solution S * returned by the algorithm violates each budget constraint at most by a factor (1 + ). We next show that S h := S * is (1 + ) 2 -approximate.
Let OP T be an optimum solution to the original problem instance and let j be the largest index such that 0 (OP T ) 0 B 0,j (1 + ) sign0 . In particular,
Observe that there is one such value B 0,j , since 0,min ≤ 0 (OP T ) ≤ m 0,max . Note that OP T is feasible for P j , i.e., i (OP T ) i B i for i ≥ 0. To see this consider an execution of (S j , 0,j (·)) = feasible(P j , , B 0,j ) in algorithm multi. Observe that 0 (·) = 0,j (·) B 0,j B0,j , B 0 = B 0,j , and B 0 = B 0,j . For any i ≥ 1,
Moreover,
This implies that a solution S j is returned for subproblem P j . By the optimality of
It follows that
The cost of S * = S h then satisfies
We next prove the bitonicity of feasible: via the Composition Theorem 2.1 this will imply the monotonicity of multi.
Lemma 3.2. Procedure feasible is bitonic with respect to 0,j (·) on subproblem P j .
Proof. To fix notation, consider an execution of (S j , 0,j (·)) = feasible(P j , , B 0,j ) in algorithm multi.
Observe that 0 (·) = 0,j (·) B 0,j B0,j , B 0 = B 0,j , and B 0 = B 0,j . Let alsoS j be the solution output by feasible for problemP j .
Since 0,j (·) = B0 B 0 0 (·), it is sufficient to prove bitonicity with respect to 0 (·). Suppose we modify s (f ) to¯ s (f ) s s (f ) for some s ∈ {0, . . . , k}. Observe that this implies¯ s (f ) s s (f ). Consider the case¯ s (f ) = s (f ): here S j =S j and so the algorithm is trivially bitonic. Then assume¯ s (f ) s s (f ). By F we denote the set of feasible solutions to P j computed by A. Note that F ⊆F, since every feasible solution to P j is feasible forP j as well. Moreover, every solution inF \ F must contain f .
Consider first the case f ∈ S j . We will show that
Moreover, because S j ∈ F ⊆F and the algorithm returns in
Step F4 lexicographically best solution we haveΛ(S j ) Λ (S j ). As a consequence,Λ(S j ) Λ (S j ) Λ(S j ). On the other hand, for any f / ∈ S ∈ F, Λ(S ) = Λ(S ) Λ(S j ) (where again follows from Step F4), and hence S =S j . We can conclude that f ∈S j .
Suppose now f / ∈ S j and f / ∈S j . We will show thatS j = S j (which implies¯ 0 (S j ) 0 0 (S j )). Since all the solutions inF \ F contain f ,S j ∈ F. Then Λ(S j ) = Λ(S j ) Λ(S j ) =Λ(S j ) Λ (S j ) (where we referred to Step F4 twice), which impliesΛ(S j ) = Λ(S j ). Therefore the set of solutions not containing f which optimize the length vector Λ is exactly the same in the two problems. This implies thatS j = S j by the lexicographic optimality of the solutions computed. In this section we investigate a different approach to the design of truthful mechanisms, based on the classical Lagrangian relaxation method. With this approach, we obtain a monotone randomized PTAS bmst for the budgeted minimum spanning tree problem (BMST). This implies a universally truthful mechanism for the corresponding game.
Let us start by introducing some preliminary notions. For notational convenience, let c(·) = 0 (·), (·) = 1 (·) and L = B 1 . By c min and c max we denote the smallest and largest cost, respectively. BMST can be defined as follows:
Here X denotes the set of incidence vectors of spanning trees of the input graph G = (V, E). For a Lagrangian multiplier λ ≥ 0, the Lagrangian relaxation of the problem is (see [20] )
The problem above is essentially a standard minimum spanning tree problem, with respect to the Lagrangian costs c (e) = c(e) + λ (e). Observe that, for any λ ≥ 0, LAG(λ) ≤ OP T . We let λ * (optimal Lagrangian multiplier ) be a value of λ ≥ 0 which maximizes LAG(λ). In case of a tie, we let λ * be the smallest such value. If λ * = ∞, there is no feasible solution. We remark that λ * can be computed in strongly-polynomial-time O(m O(1) ), using, say, Megiddo's parametric search technique (see, e.g., [20] ).
Function LAG(λ) has a natural geometric interpretation. For any spanning tree S with incidence vector x(S), c λ (S) := e∈E c(e)x e (S) + λ · ( e∈E (e)x e (S) − L) is a linear function of the multiplier λ. In particular, the slope of c λ (S) is positive if S is infeasible, and nonpositive otherwise. LAG(λ) is the lower envelope of the lines c λ (S), for λ ≥ 0 and S ∈ S. Observe that LAG(λ) is concave and piecewise linear. When no confusion is possible, we use the notion of spanning tree and line interchangeably. We observe the following useful fact.
Lemma 4.1. Consider the lower envelope LE of a set of solutions. Let S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S q be the solutions intersecting LE, sorted in decreasing order of length (breaking ties arbitrarily). Then, for i < j, c(S
Proof. It is sufficient to show that, for any i = 1, 2, . . . , q − 1, c(S i ) ≤ c(S i+1 ). If S i (λ) and S i+1 (λ) overlap, the claim is trivially true. Otherwise, let λ be the value of λ for which S i (λ ) = S i+1 (λ ) (the two lines cannot be parallel, since they both intersect LE).
Recall that (S
4.1 Algorithm Algorithm bmst is described in Figure 3 . The first step of the construction is a random perturbation of the costs (Step B1). The factor T = 2 m in the perturbation is simply an upper bound on the number of spanning trees. Our perturbation will ensure, with high probability, that no more than 2 lines corresponding to spanning trees intersect at a given point. Then (Step B2), the algorithm generates a polynomial set of subproblems P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P h . Intuitively, each subproblem corresponds to a guess of the most expensive edges in the optimum solution OP T , and to a guess of their approximate cost. More precisely, each subproblem j is labeled by a pair (F j , g j (·)), where F j is a subset of 1/ edges, and g j : F j → C, where C = {c 1 , . . . , c q } is a proper set of rounded costs. Given a pair j = (F j , g j (·)), subproblem P j is obtained by removing F j and all the edges of cost larger than min e∈Fj {g j (e)}, and decreasing L by (F ).
Each subproblem P j is solved by means of a procedure lagrangian, based on the Lagrangian relaxation method. In particular, following [20] , among the solutions intersecting LAG at λ * , we select two adjacent solutions S − and S + , of non-positive and positive slope respectively, and return S j = S − . We recall that two spanning trees S − and S + are adjacent in the spanning tree polytope if there are edges e + and e − such that
As mentioned in the introduction, in case of ties we select the pair (S − , S + ) with maximum c(S − ). Eventually (Step B3), bmst returns the (feasible) solution F j ∪ S j of minimum cost c(F j ∪ S j ) = c(F j ) + c(S j ) (and largest index j in case of ties).
We remark that the values t e in the perturbation are independent from edge costs and lengths, and hence we can assume that they are the same in the original (P j ) and modified (P j ) problems. In other words, each choice of the t e 's specifies one deterministic algorithm. We will show that each such algorithm is monotone. Note also that monotonicity on the perturbed instance implies monotonicity on the original instance, since the bmst(P, ) B1: For all e ∈ E, independently generate an integer te uniformly at random in {1, . . . , 2T 4 }, T = 2 m , and replace c(e) with c(e)(1 + te 2T 4 ) B2: Let c1 ≤ . . . ≤ cq be the powers of (1 + ) between cmin/(1 + ) and cmax(1 + ). Let 1, . . . , h denote all the pairs (F, g(·)) with F ⊆ E, |F | = 1 , and g : F → {c1, . . . , cq}. For a given pair j = (Fj, gj(·)), define subproblem Pj by removing from G, Fj and all the edges of value larger than mine∈F j {gj(e)} and decreasing B by (Fj). Compute Sj = lagrangian(Pj). perturbation does not change the sign of the difference between modified and original costs/lengths. As a consequence, the resulting mechanism will be universally truthful. The random perturbation has the following property.
Lemma 4.2. After the perturbation, with probability at least 1 − 1/T , all the spanning trees correspond to different lines, and at most two lines intersect at a given point.
Proof. Consider any two lines S 1 (λ) and S 2 (λ), and let i and c i be the length and perturbed cost of S i , respectively. The two lines overlap if and only if c 1 = c 2 and 1 = 2 . Let us condition over the cost of all the edges of S 1 and of all the edges of S 2 but one. Then c 2 is a random variable which takes one value uniformly at random in a set of 2T 4 distinct values. Hence the event {c 1 = c 2 } happens with probability at most 1/2T
4 . Consider now any three lines S 1 (λ), S 2 (λ) and S 3 (λ). With the same notation as above, these three lines intersect at the same point if and only if
If 1 = 2 , it must be c 1 = c 2 which happens with probability at most 1/2T
4 by the same argument as before. Otherwise it must be c 3 = c 1 + λ( 1 − 3 ) with λ = (c 1 − c 2 )/( 2 − 1 ): this happens with probability at most 1/2T
4 by a similar argument. Since there are at most T 2 pairs and T 3 triples of the kind above, by the union bound the probability that the property of the claim is not satisfied is at most
Lemma 4.2 immediately implies that, with high probability, there are exactly two solutions of optimal Lagrangian cost. This will be crucial to prove that the running time of bmst is polynomial in expectation.
Analysis
The following lemma shows approximation guarantee and efficiency of algorithm bmst. 1/ ) instances of lagrangian, which is polynomial in the input size for any constant > 0. The running time of lagrangian is dominated, modulo polynomial factors, by the number of spanning trees of optimal Lagrangian cost for the instance considered. This number is at most T deterministically, and it is exactly 2 with probability at least (1 − 1/T ) by Lemma 4.2. Hence the expected running time of lagrangian is polynomial.
Let OP T be the optimum solution to the perturbed instance, and F the 1/ most expensive edges in OP T . Consider the assignment g : F → {c 1 , . . . , c q } such that, for each e ∈ F , g(e) ≥ c(e) ≥ g(e)/(1 + ). Let OP T and OP T be the optimum solution to the subproblems induced by j = (F, g(·)) and (F, c| F (·)), respectively. Observe that c(OP T ) = c(OP T ) − c(F ). Moreover, c(OP T ) ≤ c(OP T ) since min e∈F {c(e)} ≤ min e∈F {g(e)} (intuitively, for a given guess F we prune more edges with c(·) than with g(·)). Altogether c(OP T ) ≤ c(OP T )−c(F ). Note also that in subproblem P j each edge e costs at most ( It follows that c(F )+c(S − ) ≤ c(OP T )+ (1+ )c(OP T ). It is easy to see that the initial perturbation increases the cost of the optimal solution at most by a factor (1+ ) (deterministically). Thus the overall approximation factor is (1 + )(1 + (1 + )) ≤ 1 + 5 .
Before presenting the proof of the bitonicity of algorithm lagrangian, let us give some intuitions about bitonicity in case (i) of Definition 2.1; the other case is similar. Let (λ * , LAG(λ * )) and (λ * , LAG(λ * )) be the optimal Lagrangian point in the original and modified problems respectively.
A high level intuition in this case is that when an agent f decreases her (f ) or her c(f ) then the original output line S − either rotates down (with its cpoint fixed) or translates down. Because of concavity of LAG(λ * ) this can move λ * only to the left, thus λ * ≤ λ * . This implies monotonicity, because all nonpositive slope lines in the modified problem intersecting (λ * , LAG(λ * )) must contain f . For bitonicity, consider the optimal Lagrangian multiplier λ * and recall that we output a line S
(ii) Case f / ∈ S − : If f ∈S − , there is nothing to show.
So assume f / ∈S − : we have to show thatc(S − ) ≥ c(S − ). For λ > λ * , the solutions of non-positive slope not containing f have Lagrangian cost larger than LAG(λ * ) ≥ LAG(λ * ) ≥ LAG(λ * ). Thereforeλ * ≥ λ * . We can conclude by the same argument as in Case (i) that the slope ofS − is not larger than the slope of S − . Hence, by Lemma 4.1 applied to the lower envelope LAG f = LAG f of the lines not containing f ,c(S − ) = c(S − ) ≥ c(S − ).
Corollary 4.1. The procedure which returns F j ∪ S j for a given problem P j is bitonic with respect to c(·).
Proof. If f ∈ F j , then P j =P j and hence S j =S j . In this case the procedure is trivially bitonic. Otherwise (f / ∈ F j ), suppose f ∈ F j ∪ S j (i.e., f ∈ S j ). By Lemma 4.4, f ∈S j andc(S j ) ≤ c(S j ). It follows that c(F j ∪S j ) = c(F j ) +c(S j ) ≤ c(F j ) + c(S j ) = c(F j ∪ S j ). It remains to consider the case f / ∈ F j ∪S j . If f ∈ F j ∪S j there is nothing to show. Hence assume f / ∈ F j ∪S j , which implies f / ∈S j . By Lemma 4.4,c(S j ) ≥ c(S j ) which impliesc(F j ∪S j ) ≥ c(F j ∪ S j ).
Lemma 4.5. Algorithm bmst is monotone.
Proof. Analogously to the proof of Lemma 3.3, we define a variant ideal of bmst which considers all the powers of (1 + ) for any guess. Also in this case the solution computed by ideal and bmst is the same. In fact, when min e∈Fj {g j (e)} < c min , all the edges are removed and the problem becomes infeasible. Vice versa, for min e∈Fj {g j (e)} > c max , no edge is discarded and one obtains exactly the same subproblem by replacing each g j (e) with min{g j (e), c max }. Algorithm ideal is monotone by the Composition Theorem 2.1 and Corollary 4.1. It follows that bmst is monotone as well. Theorem 1.2 follows from Lemmas 4.3 and 4.5, by applying the results in [5, 15] .
